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The current financial crisis, which has lasted almost one and a half years, is the 
19th such crisis in the post-war period in advanced economies. Recent literature 
classifies the Nordic crises in Norway, Sweden and Finland in late 1980's and 
early 1990’s among the Big Five crises that have happened before the current 
crisis, which is now of a global nature. This paper outlines the developments of 
the Nordic crises, reasons behind them and crisis management by the authorities. 
Relatively more emphasis is placed on the Finnish crisis, as it was the deepest 
one. The paper concludes by considering the lessons that can be drawn from the 
Nordic crises. 
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Meneillään oleva, kohta puolitoista vuotta kestänyt rahoituskriisi on järjestykses-
sään 19. toisen maailman sodan jälkeinen kriisi kehittyneissä talouksissa. Viime-
aikainen tutkimus on erottanut meneillään olevaa kriisiä edeltävistä 18 rahoitus-
kriisistä viisi suurta, joihin Norjan, Ruotsin ja Suomen 1980-luvun lopun ja 1990-
luvun alun kriisit kuuluvat. Tässä paperissa kuvataan ensin kriisien kehittyminen 
näissä pohjoismaissa, jonka jälkeen tarkastellaan kriiseihin johtaneita syitä ja 
viranomaisten toimia kriisien hallitsemiseksi. Suomen rahoituskriisi saa tarkaste-
luissa suhteellisesti ottaen enemmän painoa, koska se oli näistä kolmesta kaikkein 
syvin. Tarkastelujen lopuksi pohditaan mitä pohjoismaiden rahoituskriiseistä voi-
taisiin oppia. 
 
Avainsanat: rahoitusmarkkinoiden sääntelyn purkaminen, pankkien luotonanto, 
ylikuumeneminen, rahoituskriisi 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G01, G21, E44  
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The current financial turmoil has now lasted well over a year. In the postwar 
period, the current crisis is the 19th in advanced economies and the first one in the 
21st century. In a recent paper Carmen Reinhard and Kenneth Rogoff (2008) 
divide the 18 crises before the current US subprime crisis into ‘Big Five’ and 
smaller crises. The Big Five include the crises in Norway, Finland and Sweden 
that occurred mostly in early 1990’s. The Norwegian crisis started already in late 
1980’s but continued into 1990’s. 
  Nearly all major banks in the Nordic countries got into difficulties and made 
huge losses, with average loss provisions (expressed as percentage of lending) in 
the period 1982–1993 ranging from 2.1 (in Denmark) to 1.5 per cent (in Finland 
and Norway) of bank lending. In the sub-period 1990–1993 loss provisions were 
2.9 per cent for Denmark, 3.4 per cent for Finland, 2.7 per cent for Norway, and 
4.8 per cent in Sweden.
1 All of the Nordic countries had to provide public support 
to their banking systems. In Denmark this support was small whereas in Norway, 
Sweden and Finland public support was quite significant with increasing 
importance in the indicated order of countries. The financial crises in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden became systemic, whereas Denmark avoided a systemic 
crisis. Thus, I will not cover the Danish case in any detail. 
  Even though each financial crisis has its own particular features, experiences 
and lessons from earlier crises can provide useful insights for understanding later 
crises. My goal today is to outline the developments of the Nordic crises, reasons 
behind them, and the crisis management by the authorities. I will put some 
emphasis on the Finnish case, because it was the deepest crisis of the three and 
because it is my home country. 
  My speech is organized as follows. First, I will describe the main features and 
stages of the crises. Second, I will analyze the reasons behind them. The crises 
differed, but there were also common features. Third, I will discuss how the 
public authorities in the three countries managed the crises. Finally, I will 
consider lessons from the Nordic crises. 
  Before I start, I must say a few words about my perspective on the subject. In 
the early 1990s I was a Professor in the University of Helsinki and had no official 
connection to the Finnish authorities handling the crisis. I was, to an extent, a 
critic of the policies, especially at the early stage of the Finnish crisis. However, 
this period influenced me greatly; it was the starting point of my occasional public 
appearances to discuss economic policies.  I must also note that my role in 
economic policy discussions recently changed when I became a policymaker as 
Member of the Board of the Bank of Finland in the beginning of 2008.    
                                                 
1 These figures are from Møller and Nielsen (1995).  
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2  Overview of the volatile economies
2 
I now describe the main macroeconomic and financial developments in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden in Figures 2.1–2.9, starting from mid 1980’s. The figures 
show, respectively, annual GDP change (in %), current accounts in per cent of 
GDP, unemployment rates (in %), real residential property prices (indices 
1980=100), real share prices (indices 1980=100), annual growth in bank lending 




2.1 The  real  economy 
Starting with economic growth, shown in Figure 2.1, it is seen that the Finnish 
experience was quite dramatic. Finland experienced relatively fast growth in the 
second half of 1980s, and the economy became overheated at the end of the 
decade. The country then plunged into a deep recession in the beginning of 1990s, 
with negative growth for about three years. The total cumulative fall in GDP was 
well over ten per cent from peak to trough. After that Finland experienced a fast 
recovery and growth has remained strong to the present day, with some normal 
cyclical fluctuations. 
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Finland Sweden Norway
%
Sources: Eurostat and IMF.  
 
                                                 
2 See Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), Englund (1999) and Steigum (2004) for overviews of the 
three countries.  
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The Swedish experience is qualitatively similar but less extreme. Sweden had 
relatively rapid growth performance in the 2nd half of 1980s, though it grew more 
sluggishly than Finland. It also plunged into a recession, with negative growth in 
the beginning of 1990s, but the recession was not as deep as in Finland. Recovery 
was also fast and after the crisis Swedish growth performance has been good and, 
indeed, somewhat better than before the recession.  
10 
  The Norwegian case is different from the other two. Norway experienced 
difficulties already in the second half of 1980s, with growth rate around zero in 
1987. This was due to a major decline in oil prices in 1986, which in view of the 
big role of oil led to a slowdown of the economy. The slowdown lasted well into 
the beginning of 1990s. Overall, the Norwegian crisis was less severe than the 
Swedish case (and a fortiori the Finnish o n e )  a s  i t  d i d  not experience any 
significant period of negative growth. The sluggish period in Norway lasted 
longer than in Finland and Sweden, but the country has recovered well. 
  Looking at current accounts in Figure 2.2, it is seen that Finland and, to 
somewhat lesser extent, Sweden faced major external deficits in the second half of 
1980s. These deficits turned into surpluses after the crises and current accounts 
have remained in surplus ever since. The Norwegian experience was different: the 
decline in oil prices resulted in current accounts deficits from 1986 to 1988 but the 
external balance has been positive otherwise. It can be noted that all three 
countries experienced speculative attacks during the crisis and these attacks were 
quite strong for Finland and Sweden. All three countries eventually abandoned the 
fixed exchange rate regime. 
  Development of unemployment in the three countries, shown in Figure 2.3, is 
broadly a mirror image of GDP developments. All three countries initially had 
low unemployment, which started to rise a part of the financial crises. Norway 
experienced the rise earlier than Finland and Sweden. As the Finnish crisis was 
the deepest, the unemployment rate increased by far the most during the crisis. In 




2.2 Financial  developments 
Figure 2.4 shows the developments in residential property prices. The 
developments are qualitatively similar in the three countries, with movements in 
Norway taking place earlier. Property prices rose rapidly during the booms and 
declined sharply during the financial crises. Finland had the most extreme 
movements. Property price movements were also strong in Norway and it can be 
noted that the decline from 1986 lasted quite long, ending only in 1993. The 
Swedish case is less extreme than the Norwegian one and the Swedish prices also 
turned around relatively slowly. In contrast, the up- and downswings in Finnish 
property prices were faster than in the other two countries. 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that unemployment in Finland is systematically higher than in Norway or 
Sweden.  
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Nominal house prices deflated using the consumer price index.
Sources: Statistics Finland, Statistics Sweden, Norges Bank and 
Bank of Finland.  
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Dynamics of share prices, shown in Figure 2.5, in Finland and Sweden tell 
roughly the same story as residential property prices. Share prices rose rapidly 
from mid 1980s to the end of the decade, after which they experienced a major 
decline for about three years. In contrast, Norwegian share prices moved much 
less during the 1980s and early 1990s.
4 
  Next, I consider bank lending. Figure 6 shows the annual growth rates in bank 
lending for the three countries. It is seen that each country experienced fast 
growth in lending during the boom years in the 1980’s. The Norwegian boom is 
seen to happen earlier than those of Finland and Sweden. The boom and bust in 
lending were most extreme in Finland. Quite remarkably, both Finland and 
Sweden had negative lending growth for several years. The loans to GDP ratio 
rose rapidly during boom years and declined by almost the same amount in the 
recessions in Finland and Sweden. In Norway, the decline was much smaller. 
  To conclude the overview, we look at realized loan loss provisions of banks in 
the three countries in Figures 2.7–2.9. The figures show loss provisions as 
percentage of balance sheet for the major parts of the banking system. It is seen 
that in each country these loss provisions rose rapidly in the beginning of the 
crisis. In Finland the crisis was deepest for savings bank group, whereas in 
Norway commercial banks had the highest loss provisions. In Sweden different 
banking groups had similar loss provision developments. The heavy losses led to 
                                                 
4 The figure shows huge increases and subsequent in share prices in Finland and Sweden (but not 
in Norway) around the turn of the century. These developments are the result of the IT revolution 
as Nokia dominates the Finnish stock market and Eriksson is similarly a very large player in the 
Swedish stock market.  
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significant restructuring of the banking systems and I will come back to these 
later. 
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The macroeconomic and financial developments just described suggest that the 
nexus of financial deregulation, macroeconomic policies, and the external 
economic environment has major consequences for the occurrence of financial 
crises. Below I examine these connections further. 
 
 
3  Reasons behind the crises 
Let me next consider the main factors behind the crises. I will discuss the Finnish 
case in some detail and then just comment on the Norwegian and Swedish cases. 
 
 
3.1 The  boom 
The Finnish economy performed relatively smoothly in the 1st half of 1980s. 
Despite gradual disinflation, the Finnish inflation rate remained higher than the 
rates of its main competitors and there was a deterioration of its international 
competitiveness. The smooth ride began to get bumpy around 1986–1987. 
Economic growth accelerated significantly and the economy gradually entered a 
period of overheating. Several factors were behind this change. 
  First, financial market deregulation led to an explosion of domestic bank 
credit as we saw in the earlier figure. As will be discussed further below, the 
process of deregulation was not carried out in the most logical way. Following the 
financial deregulation, banks had to adjust a new regime of price-competition  
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instead of competition with service provision in the regulated era. The new 
possibilities for competition between banks led to increased risk-taking as a result 
of moral hazard and myopic behavior. 
  Second, freeing of international capital movements led to a huge increase in 
capital inflows, a significant fraction of which was denominated in foreign 
currencies and not hedged. Restrictive monetary policy accentuated the capital 
inflows as a result of the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign 
interest rates and partly because investors perceived a small likelihood of loss 
from exchange rate movements. 
  Third, a sharp increase in the terms of trade resulting from a falling energy 
prices and a rise in world market prices of forest products contributed to the 
overheating of the economy that was already fuelled by the financial deregulation. 
The business cycle was in an upswing in many countries, partly as a result of the 
loose monetary policy after the 1987 stock market crisis. This added to the bad 
luck of overheating in Finland and Sweden. Domestic economic policies were not 
sufficiently restrictive to counteract the boom. 
  In the process of overheating, the rate of inflation rose from about 2–3 per 
cent in 1986 to about 7 per cent in 1989–1990. The rate of unemployment 
declined from the about 4 per cent in the first half of the decade to 2.5–3 per cent 
at the end of 1989. The external balance for Finland worsened and serious current 
account problems emerged. It may be noted that Sweden experienced less 
overheating in the second half of the decade. For 1985–1990, the average current 
account deficit-to-GDP ratio was 2.9 per cent for Finland, while the 
corresponding figure for Sweden was only 1.1 per cent. 
  The overall developments in the upswing before the Norwegian and Swedish 
crises in were similar to those for Finland. Financial market deregulation and 
positive international business-cycle developments were the main factors behind 
the domestic booms and rapidly rising real asset and share prices. However, for 
Norway the major fall in oil prices in 1986 was a major negative shock that 
prevented a longer-lasting boom and a correspondingly bigger bust. 
 
 
3.2 The  bust 
The end of the boom in Finland came in 1990, and a rapid descent ensued. 
Economic activity, as measured by the growth rate of real GDP, declined swiftly 
from positive growth of 5.4% in 1989 to negative growth of -6.5% in 1991. 
Domestic private investment and private consumption fell sharply, while net 
exports of goods and services started to pick up toward the end of 1991. The 
decline continued, though at a slower pace through 1992 and most of 1993. A 
turnaround took place in the fall of 1993. Price inflation slowed down  
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significantly and nearly vanished. The Finnish markka was devalued in November 
1991 and then floated in September 1992. After these developments, the current 
account deficit gradually disappeared and shifted to surplus. 
  Both international and domestic factors contributed to the onset of Finnish 
crisis. First, Finnish exports to market economies declined as a result of slow 
international growth, loss in the price competitiveness of Finnish industry, and a 
decline in the terms of trade. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, 
Finnish exports and imports to Russia quickly dropped by 70 per cent in March 
1991. This significantly contributed to the decline in Finnish GDP in the crisis 
years. 
  Second, after German unification, interest rates rose in Europe and also in 
Finland, as a result of more expansive fiscal policy combined with tighter 
monetary policy in Germany. 
  Third, monetary conditions became very restrictive due to an increase in real 
interest rates and appreciation of the Finnish markka. Real interest rates rose 
dramatically from the start of 1990 until the end of 1992 as a result of the defense 
of the Finnish markka against speculative attacks with high nominal interest rates 
and because of the fall in the inflation rate at the onset of recession. Figure 3.1 
shows the interest rate differential between Finland and Germany and the Finnish 
real interest rate. Figure 3.2 shows the exchange rate for the Finnish markka. 
 
Figure 3.1  Real interest rate in Finland and interest rate 
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Interest rate differential to Germany (RHS)
% Percentage points
* Nominal interest rate - consumer price inflation.
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Trade-weighted currency index. Rising curve indicates FIM depreciation.
Source: Bank of Finland.  
 
 
In Sweden the reasons for the onset of the crisis were similar to those for Finland, 
ie Sweden also experienced the high German interest rates and speculative attacks 
against the Swedish krona.
5 There was, however, one major difference to Finland. 
Sweden had little trade with the Soviet Union, so that the break-down of Soviet 
Union had no economic impact on Sweden. Moreover, lack of trade with the 
Soviet Union meant that Swedish industry had been forced to modernize already 
before the 1908s. In contrast, large trade with Soviet Union had led to lack of 
competitiveness of parts of Finnish industry in western markets. These factors 
meant that the Swedish crisis was not as deep as the Finnish one. Both economies 
started to recover in 1993–1994. 
  For Norway, I already mentioned that the turnaround of the boom came 
already in 1986 with the decline of oil prices. The Norwegian krona was devalued 
by 6 per cent in response to this decline and restrictive policies were introduced. 
Inflation gradually declined from 1987 and by 1990 the rate of inflation went 
below the average rate of its trading partners. The crisis in Norway lasted a fairly 
long time and the turn round of the business cycle occurred in 1993. 
 
 
3.3  Reasons for the crises 
The emergence of major banking crises was a notable feature of the bust process 
in all three Nordic crises. A deep financial crisis also emerged in Norway, even 
though the fluctuations in the real economy were much smaller than those in 
                                                 
5 You may recall that Swedish interest rates briefly reached even 500 per cent during the defense 
of the currency.  
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Finland and Sweden. The latter countries had severe declines in GDP, which in 
turn contributed to the financial crises. 
  For concreteness, I again look at the Finnish case. The roots of the boom-bust 
cycle and the financial crisis can be traced back to the deregulation of the 
financial system in the 1980’s. The process of financial deregulation began in the 
early 1980’s, but the greater part of it was carried out in the second half of the 
decade. Liberalization of domestic financial markets and of international capital 
flows was implemented at a time when interest rates in Finland were much higher 
than abroad. This caused a massive capital inflow that led to uncontrolled credit 
expansion. This effect was also strong in Sweden and it operated, to a lesser 
extent, in Norway; see Sandal (2004). 
  The deregulation process was problematic in several respects. First, it’s 
timing in the second half of the 1980’s coincided with the upswings of business 
cycles in Western market economies. As was already noted, the big boom led to 
soaring indebtedness in the private sector, higher relative unit labor costs, and a 
current account deficit. Later on, it led to speculative attacks on the Finnish 
markka. 
  Second, the prevailing banking law from 1969 was outdated and bank 
supervision focused on solely legalistic monitoring of banks. The rules and 
practices in prudential regulation and bank supervision were left unchanged in the 
deregulation process. These were tightened only later in 1991, when the 
depression had already begun. 
  Third, the tax system favored debt financing of business and housing 
investment and it was reformed only later. Some reforms were attempted during 
the boom years but there was little political support for the reform proposals. 
  Fourth, in the context of deregulation, lending rates were liberated before 
deposit rates, which also helped to ease the banks’ position. Finally, monetary 
policy under a fixed exchange rate with a narrow band tried to maintain some 
tightness in the wake of the boom. This provided further impetus to the large (in 
foreign currency terms) inflow of foreign capital. The capital inflows to private 
sector were mediated largely by Finnish banks and led to foreign-currency-
denominated borrowing also by firms operating in the non-tradable sector. 
  The financial crisis had also an international dimension for Finland and 
Sweden. (Norway suffered less in this dimension.) For both countries problems of 
international indebtedness and illiquidity emerged and, as I argued above, these 
features result from an earlier real appreciation and lending boom after financial 
deregulation. Next, I briefly compare Finland’s and Sweden’s international 
indebtedness to those of Mexico, Chile and East Asian countries. 
  A country may be able to withstand a relatively high level of international 
indebtedness, provided its economic growth remains solid, the debt is largely 
long-term, and the confidence of international investors remains intact. 
Nevertheless, a high international debt position means increasing risks, should a  
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country run into economic difficulties. Table 3.1 shows the external debt-to-GDP 
ratio for Finland and Sweden for the period 1982–2001. For comparison, the table 
also shows the data for Chile (1984–2001), for Mexico (1984–1993), for Korea 
(1990–2001), and for Thailand (1995–2001). 
 
Table 3.1  International Indebtedness
6 
 
International Indebtedness: Net foreign debt, % of GDP
  Finland Sweden Mexico Chile Korea Thailand
1982 17 19
1983 20 22
1984 19 20 48 73
1985 19 21 46 88
1986 17 19 58 85   
1987 20 17 53 74   
1988 19 19 41 50   
1989 23 21 31 33   
1990 45 26 30 17 -32 ..
1991 50 28 26 17 10 ..
1992 53 23 22 14 11 ..
1993 54 41 20 16 20 ..
1994 63 45 .. 23 ..
1995 56 39 .. .. 32
1996 54 39  .. .. 35
1997 46 39  33,7 .. 49
1998 87 38  37,7 .. 57
1999 180 31  35,4 .. 38
2000 140 25  37,1 .. 48
2001 74 ..  41,7 152 43
Sources:  IMF
Crisis: 1992-93 EMS crisis, 1994-95 Mexican meltdown and 'Tequila Hangover', 
1997-98 'Asian Flu'. Source: FRB of San Francisco, Economic Letter, August 1998
Countries affected by crisis. Source: World Economic Outlook, 1998  
 
 
The build-up of international debt for Finland is seen to be quite significant 
because the Finnish current account deficits were large before the crisis. In 
contrast, Sweden shows a similar but more gradual build-up of foreign debt.  This 
suggests that the external situation for Finland, and to an extent for Sweden, was 
relatively risky, so that the pressures mounted rapidly once the general outlook 
became gloomy in 1990–1991. 
  In comparison, international indebtedness for Mexico was very high in the 
1980s and even higher for Chile in the mid-1980s. Thailand experienced a fairly 
rapid increase in its foreign indebtedness in 1997–1998. These indebtedness 
problems were a central element in financial crises in these countries. 
  Table 3.1 suggests that the financial crisis in Finland and Sweden had features 
similar to those in Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. 
                                                 
6 The table is from Honkapohja et al (2008). Note that the figures include foreign ownership of 
equity capital, which in the Finnish case distorts the figures at the end of 1990s because of the high 
share prices and large foreign ownership of the Nokia corporation.  
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4  Management of the crises 
The Nordic financial crises required major policy interventions by the 
governments and parliaments. I next describe the main features of crisis 
management in the three countries, focusing first on the deepest crisis, ie Finland. 
After that I discuss crisis management in Norway and Sweden. All three countries 
are considered in some detail as each case can give specific lessons. 
  Before analyzing these cases, I want to comment on the reasons why 
Denmark avoided a systemic banking crisis even though the loan losses of Danish 
banks were significant and a few Danish banks had to be rescued by the public 
sector.
7 One reason for the better Danish performance was good luck with the 
timing of reforms. Denmark started to deregulate the financial system earlier than 
the other three Nordic countries, and this happened before the boom years in the 
second half of 1980s. For example, interest deductibility provisions were reduced 
in a tax reform, which reduced attractiveness of debt finance. Prudential 
supervision and disclosure rules and capital adequacy requirements for Danish 
banks were made stricter than for other Nordic banks. The better condition of 
Danish banks explains why in difficult times in the beginning of 1990s, most 
Danish banks were able to raise new private equity in conjunction with cost-
cutting and restructuring operations and little public intervention was needed. 
 
 
4.1 Management  of  the  Finnish banking crisis
8 
Policy actions to overcome the Finnish banking crisis began in September 1991 
when the Bank of Finland had to take control of Skopbank, the ‘central bank’ of 
the Savings bank system as other banks refused accept certificates by Skopbank. 
This was an unusual but necessary step as no other public institutional 
arrangement existed for rescuing a bank in major difficulties.
9 
                                                 
7 See Koskenkylä (2000) and Moeller and Nielsen (1995) for more details. See Edey and Hviding 
(1995) for comparisons of financial reform in OECD countries. 
8 Largely based on Honkapohja et al (2008) and Honkapohja and Koskela (1999). See also Nyberg 
and Vihriälä (1994), Vihriälä (1997), and Koskenkylä (2000) for discussions of the Finnish crisis. 
9 Bank of Finland sold Skopbank in June 1992 to the newly established Government Guarantee 
Fund. The operation was quite costly to the Bank of Finland, with net cost of around 11 billion 
FIM plus foregone interest income (around 2,65 billion USD using the exchange rate of 4.15 
prevailing at the end of 1991.)  
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  Further policy measures were initiated in early 1992. The government injected 
public funds, in the form of preferred capital certificates, into the banking system 
and set up a Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) to manage the banking crisis. 
Tight conditions were imposed on the public support to the banks as the capital 
certificates could be converted into voting stock if certain conditions about 
repayment and bank solvency were not fulfilled. Moreover, the interest rate on the 
certificates was set slightly above the market rate. Correspondingly, further GGF 
actions included strict requirements on the banks including transparency of 
support, monitoring of banks receiving support, terms to support efficiency and 
structural adjustment of the banking system, and (in varying degrees) financial 
responsibility of owners of banks receiving support. 
  As the crisis continued, the government (in August 1992) and the Parliament 
(in the beginning of 1993) made public promises that the obligations of the 
Finnish banking system would be guaranteed under all circumstances. In early 
1993 the GGF was strengthened and it was given additional capital. Public 
support of the banking industry continued through 1994. A modest improvement 
in the banking sector took place in 1993, and further improvements came in 1994 
and 1995. Loss making by banks stopped only in 1996, and since 1997 the banks 
have made significant positive profits. In the end, most of the public support for 
banks went to the savings banks. 
  Improved efficiency of Finnish banks was achieved through reduction of the 
number of branches and staff. For example, the number of staff was 
approximately halved in eight years from 1990 to 1998. Major restructuring of the 
banking sector took place during the crisis. Most of the 250 Savings banks were 
combined into the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF) in June 1992. The new bank 
was, however, not viable and subsequently SBF was split and the pieces were 
merged with the commercial and cooperative banks as well as the government-
owned Post-Office Bank. The non-performing assets of SBF were transferred to 
an asset management company, Arsenal, which was owned by GGF. A small 
commercial bank, STS-Bank, was merged with a big commercial bank (KOP). In 
1995 KOP, one of the two big commercial banks was in turn merged with the 
other big commercial bank (SYP) to form Merita Bank. 
  After the crisis, structural changes continued with the merger of Merita Bank, 
the remaining Finnish commercial bank with Nordbanken of Sweden in 1997. 
Another restructuring occurred in 1998 between the government-owned Post-
Office Bank and Vientiluotto (Export Credit Institution), which led to the creation 
of Leonia Bank. More recently, Merita-Nordbanken merged with a Danish bank 
and a Norwegian bank to form Nordea, a pan-Nordic Bank. Another merger 
occurred between Leonia Bank and Sampo Insurance Corporation, which created 
the Finnish bank-insurance conglomerate Sampo. In 2007 the banking business of 
Sampo was sold to the Danske Bank. As a result of all the restructurings about 60 
per cent of the Finnish banking system is nowadays owned by foreigners.  
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4.2  Management of the Swedish banking crisis 
The banking crisis in Sweden erupted in the autumn 1991, starting with the largest 
savings bank, Första Sparbanken. The Swedish government provided a lending 
guarantee to the owners of the bank, though the guarantee was later converted into 
a loan and eventually the bank was merged into the Savings Bank of Sweden, 
together with several other savings banks. The second problem bank was 
Nordbanken, the third largest commercial bank, which was 71 per cent owned by 
the government already before the crisis. A share issue guaranteed by the 
government was made and government ownership in the bank increased. Existing 
shareholders were not penalized in this process. Restructuring of Nordbanken was 
carried out, including transfer of bad assets to a separate asset management 
company. In spring 1992 Gota Bank, the fourth largest commercial bank got into 
difficulties and was assessed not to be viable. In 1993 it was merged with 
Nordbanken and in this operation the shareholders of Gota Bank received nothing. 
  The Swedish crisis was treated in an ad hoc manner until summer 1992, but 
with increased turmoil the crisis was deemed systemic. Most banks, representing 
90 per cent of all bank assets, incurred heavy credit losses. In the autumn 1992 the 
Swedish government introduced several measures to deal with the crisis. A 
blanket creditor guarantee was issued by the government. Riskbanken, the central 
bank, provided extensive liquidity support through its currency deposits in the 
banks and lending facilities. A crisis resolution agency (Bankstödsnämnden BSN) 
was set up to implement public support to the banking system. Bank support was 
provided in a transparent manner. It was open to all banks and the criteria were 
the same for different banks. The terms were strict with requirements for risk 
reduction, cost-cutting, and improved efficiency. 
  Some Swedish banks, notably Svenska Handelsbanken, S-E Banken (and two 
other banks), did not need public support.
10 In the end 98 per cent of the public 
support went to two banks Nordbanken and Gota Bank (which was merged to 
Nordbanken in 1993). Nordbanken was eventually entered into a pan-Nordic bank 
Nordea, and the Swedish government still has a significant ownership (19,9 per 
cent in 2008) in Nordea.    
 
 
4.3  Management of the Norwegian banking crisis 
The Norwegian crisis erupted in the autumn of 1988 when a medium-sized 
commercial bank, Sunnmørsbanken, was hit by big loan losses. Shortly after, two 
savings banks also got into difficulties and in 1989–1990 further savings banks 
                                                 
10 With the exception of Handelsbanken, the other banks initially applied for support or guarantee 
but did not utilize it.  
23 
were also hit by capital losses. Initially, the Commercial Banks’ and the Savings 
Banks’ Guarantee Funds (CBGF and SBGF), which are private funds, provided 
support for the banks in difficulties and the troubled banks were later merged into 
other banks. Norges Bank, the Central Bank, provided liquidity loans in these 
cases, some part of which were not recovered in the mergers. 
  By late 1990 the private guarantee funds had used most of their resources and 
in January 1991 the government established the Government Bank Insurance 
Fund (GBIF) with capital of 0.6 per cent of 1991 GDP. Initially, GBIF provided 
additional funds for the private guarantee funds but, with continuing bank 
difficulties, injections of solvency support directly to problem banks became 
necessary. In autumn 1991 the biggest commercial banks in Norway run into deep 
problems and needed capital support. The 2nd and 3rd biggest banks Christiania 
Bank and Fokus Bank lost all of their capital, while the biggest bank, Den norske 
Bank, lost 90 per cent of its share capital. GBIF provided huge capital infusions to 
these banks under strict conditions, and by the spring 1992 all three banks were 
nationalized and the value of old shares was written down to zero. The 
government also had to take some other measures during the crisis. A blanket 
guarantee of the banking system was not made, though specific announcements 
about securing confidence in the Norwegian banking system and about securing 
depositors and creditors of Christiania Bank were made. 
  The situation of Norwegian banks started to improve rapidly in 1993. After 
the crisis the government had gradually sold its bank shares. Fokus Bank was 
placed on the market in autumn 1995 and it was later bought by Danske Bank. 
Christiania Bank was sold more gradually and was eventually merged with the 
pan-Nordic group Nordea. Similarly, shares in Den norske Bank were gradually 
sold. However, the government still holds 34 per cent of the bank DnB NOR, 
which was formed in the merger between Den norske Bank and Union Bank of 
Norway. 
  A remarkable feature of the nationalization and privatization process has been 
that, due to increases in share prices, the Norwegian tax payer has in the end been 
a net beneficiary in the crisis, ie the bank support has been more than covered 
from the sale of the nationalized banks. Somewhat similarly, the final net fiscal 
cost of the Finnish and Swedish banking turned out to be significantly smaller 
than the gross costs due to the re-sale of assets held by the public asset 
management companies. Table 2 provides one set of estimates of the costs.
11 
 
                                                 
11 The public costs can be calculated in different ways, depending on what is included and on the 
year of comparison to the size of the economy (usually GDP). Different sources give somewhat 
different estimates and the numbers in Table 4.1 should be viewed as indicative.  
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Table 4.1  Fiscal costs of bank support
12 
 
  Gross cost  Net cost (% of 1997 GDP) 
Finland  9.0 (% of 1997 GDP)  5.3 (% of 1997 GDP) 
Norway  2.0 (% of 1997 GDP), 
3.4 (present value, % of 2001 GDP) 
-0.4 (present value, % of 2001 
GDP) 




Prevention of a systemic financial crisis should, in my view, be the first priority 
even if improved efficiency and faster economic growth can eventually occur 
after the crisis.
13 Stability-oriented macro policies that avoid inflation and 
overheating are crucial in crisis prevention. The difficulty is how to diagnose an 
emerging overheating situation and an asset price bubble as not all business-cycle 
upswings, with major asset price rises, lead to a systemic financial crisis. We do 
not currently have a good set of indicators to diagnose the problematic situations, 
but a rapid expansion of credit and strongly increased leverage are likely signals 
for future problems. Big external deficits are another probable warning signal, at 
least for small open economies. Further research into the interconnections 
between the macro economy, financial system, and crises is most welcome. 
  Macroeconomic management to prevent the financial crises in the Nordic 
countries did not work well and thus does not provide lessons for crisis 
prevention.
14 The weak performance points to an important lesson about the 
political economy aspects of financial crises. Financial liberalization was a big 
regime change in the Nordic economies and preventive measures were politically 
unpopular and could not be pushed through during boom times.  It is likely that 
both resistance of special interest groups and lack of understanding of the 
changing economic environment contributed to opposition of the preventive 
reforms. For natural reasons this resistance disappeared during the crises and, 
more generally, improved willingness to reforms seems to prevail after the 
economies had become more open internationally. 
  The Nordic crises have, however, provided good cases to test the occurrence 
of the different channels for the impact of a financial crisis on the real economy. 
There is clear evidence for the role of some of the financial channels like wealth 
effects, but evidence about the credit crunch, ie lack of bank capital and 
                                                 
12 See Sandal (2004), Table 3 for details. 
13 Tornell and Westermann (2005) suggest that this can be the case especially in emerging 
economies. The subject is obviously controversial. 
14 See eg Honkapohja et al (2008), Englund (1999) and Steigum (2004) for assessments, 
respectively, for Finland, Sweden, and Norway.  
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quantitative finance constraints, in the Nordic crises seems to be weak. See 
Englund and Vihriälä (2003) and Honkapohja et al (2008) for discussions of the 
evidence with further references. 
  Crisis management by the Nordic countries has been viewed in a much more 
positive light. Several lessons can be drawn from the Nordic crises in this 
respect.
15 
  A key starting point is that maintaining confidence in the banking system is 
crucial. Finding broad bi-partisan political support for government actions
16 in the 
crisis is important for maintaining confidence and, eg, avoidance of large-scale 
bank runs. Political guarantees for obligations of banks were a major step in 
maintaining confidence, though the Nordic countries used different approaches 
here. Finland and Sweden introduced formal legal guarantees, which were lifted 
only in 1998 and 1996, respectively. In Norway the political guarantee was less 
formal. A blanket guarantee can be risky as it may increase moral hazard: 
creditors have no reason to monitor or discipline banks. On the other hand, it must 
be said that the Finnish and Swedish crises were far more severe than the 
Norwegian one and these two crises also involved a foreign dimension. 
  Looking at the role of central banks, Norges Bank explicitly provided 
emergency liquidity support to individual banks as part of the overall support 
system. In effect, Riksbank of Sweden also provided liquidity support, though it 
was not formally of lender-of-last-resort type. In Finland the role of the central 
bank was different as the Bank of Finland had to handle the initial burst of the 
banking crisis by taking over Skopbank as an ad hoc move. 
  The governments in all three countries introduced crisis resolution agencies to 
manage the public support and the restructuring of the banking system. 
Establishing an agency for the crisis management that is administratively separate 
from the Central Bank and Financial Supervision authority is important to avoid 
conflicts of interest. This will also relieve a Ministry of Finance from some ‘front-
line’ duties even if the Ministry must necessarily carry the main responsibility in 
crisis management. Finland and Sweden also introduced separate asset 
management companies to deal with the non-performing assets from the banks in 
trouble. Norway did not introduce such a company, but some of the banks had 
their own ‘bad banks’ to manage non-performing assets. 
  Crisis resolution agencies had several duties to perform. They provided 
capital injections to the banking system and guided the restructuring of the 
banking system. Liquidations were not much used (only two small banks in 
Norway were liquidated). Mergers and take-overs of banks were common way to 
achieve restructuring. A general principle was that private solutions were always 
tried first before a public take-over. In Finland, capital injections were made to 
                                                 
15 See Bäckström (1997) and Ingves and Lind (1996) for a discussion of Swedish experiences and 
Koskenkylä (2000) and Sandal (2004) for comparisons of Nordic practices. 
16 Or multi-partisan support if there many major political parties in a country.  
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private banks and public take-overs were short-lived. Government ownership was 
highest in Norway, where the state took over the three largest commercial banks. 
  The treatment of ‘old’ private shareholders was mixed. In Norway, existing 
share capital was written down to zero before the public take-over. In Finland 
shareholders of Skopbank took a hit but were not completely wiped out. 
Subsequently, support from Finnish authorities took the form of open bank 
assistance and existing shareholders did not lose their capital, but the terms of 
support included the risk of future partial state ownership. In Sweden shareholders 
of Gota Bank lost everything, but private owners of other banks did not. In all 
countries creditors were protected, except for one case in Norway. 
  Institutional arrangements in the public provision of bank support are 
naturally subject to attempts for gain by existing owners and potential future 
owners. These arrangements can also provide adverse incentives for different 
counterparties. Prompt action, openness and common yardsticks in the assessment 
of losses, fair asset valuations by experts, clear guidelines in restructuring, and 
optimal use of government funds are important to minimize moral hazard and 
possibilities for manipulation. It is naturally impossible to make any precise 
assessment of the success of policies by the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish 
authorities in these respects. Nevertheless, it can be argued that crisis resolutions 
in these countries were not far from best practice (see eg Sandal, 2004). As 
emphasized eg by Allen and Gale (1999, 2007), the impacts of banking collapses 
in the three Nordic countries were short-lived and the economies recovered fairly 
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